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Abstract In this paper we compare CP disjunction to TP disjunction and CP con-
junction to TP conjunction, and conclude that CPs and TPs do not have identical
meanings (cf. similar observations reported in Szabolcsi 1997, 2016; Bjorkman
2013). We argue that this result is incompatible with the view that the CP layer of
embedded clauses is semantically vacuous. We propose that the differences between
CPs and TPs can be explained under a particular implementation of Kratzer’s ap-
proach to the semantics of clausal embedding (Kratzer 2006, 2016; Bogal-Allbritten
2016, 2017; Moulton 2009, 2015; Elliott 2017), according to which CPs denote
predicates of events whose content equals the embedded proposition.
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1 Introduction
Theories of clausal embedding seek to identify the contribution of the different
syntactic pieces to the entailment patterns such sentences produce (1). In this paper
we focus on the complementizer, or the abstract head COMP that it realizes, and ask:
does it have a semantic contribution, and if so, what is it?
(1) Maria thinks /knows /is upset [CP that Dina is dancing].
The classical semantics for attitude reports due to Hintikka (1969) assigned
no meaning to the complementizer. On Hintikka’s theory (or a compositional
rendering thereof, e.g. von Fintel & Heim 2011), the CP meaning inherits the mean-
ing of the embedded TP—a proposition—with which the attitude verb composes:
JCP that Dina dancesK = JTP Dina dancesK = {w : Dina dances in w}. A more recent
approach, initiated by Kratzer 2006 and followed up in other work (Bogal-Allbritten
2016, 2017; Elliott 2017; Kratzer 2016; Moulton 2009, 2015), denies the claim that
TP and CP are semantically equivalent. The proponents of this approach contend
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that while the TP denotes a proposition p, syntactic material in the CP layer maps p
into a predicate of individuals with Content p.
This paper argues for a particular implementation of the latter approach. The
empirical domain that serves as the basis for our claims is CP disjunction and
CP conjunction embedded under attitude verbs: we show that they have different
inference patterns compared to the corresponding disjunction and conjunction of
TPs under a single COMP.1 We investigate CP/TP disjunction and conjunction in
four languages: English, Hebrew, Italian and Russian, and arrive at the following
conclusions. First, complementizers have semantic contribution: JCPK 6= JTPK.
Second, we follow Moulton 2015 and Elliott 2017 in arguing that they encode a
relation of identity between the embedded proposition and the content of the matrix
predicate, as is illustrated in (2).
(2) JCOMPK = λpst .λee. CONT(e) = p
Sections 2 and 3 introduce the main empirical generalizations, section 4 presents
our proposal, and section 6 provides some additional evidence in its favor. Section 7
introduces a potential problem for our account (unexpected low-scope readings of
CP conjunction) and sketches a way to account for it, section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Embedded TP disjunction & CP disjunction
Consider the two minimal pairs in (3), which differ only in the size of disjunction:
(3) a. Bill knows that [Masha sang] or [Dina danced] (TP ∨)
b. Bill knows [that Masha sang] or [that Dina danced] (CP ∨)
The two sentences give rise to distinct sets of inferences, and the difference might
for the moment be described in terms of scope. The most natural interpretation of
the TP disjunction in (3a) is one where know takes scope above or (know > or)—a
knowledge claim whose content is a disjunction—whereas CP disjunction in (3b)
obligatorily gives rise to the reverse scope (or > know)—a disjunction of knowledge
claims. There are at least two facts that point to this. The first has to do with
1 Some of our empirical claims are not without precedence in the literature. We are aware of Bjork-
man’s (2013) work on the so-called ‘asymmetrical reading’ of and, which contains some observations
regarding CP conjunction that are similar to ours (though they are differently phrased). The general-
izations we reach are even more reminiscent of those made by Szabolcsi (1997, 2016), who makes
many of the same points we do (her main concern however is interrogative CPs, which we do not
discuss). One can view the current paper as providing confirming evidence for Szabolcsi’s (1997)
claim that denotations of CPs and TPs are not identical. But the details of our account are different,
and, we believe, constitute a more uniform analysis of the facts concerning declarative CPs, which is
our focus. See the end of section 4 for a brief comparison between our proposal and Szabolcsi’s.
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ignorance inferences. If (3a) signals ignorance on part of the speaker at all, it is
ignorance about which one of the embedded disjuncts {Mary sang, Dina danced} is
true; this is expected on the surface scope since the factive presupposition of know
is a disjunctive proposition. By contrast, (3b) robustly gives rise to an ignorance
inference not about which of {Mary sang, Dina danced} is true, but about which of
them is the content of Bill’s knowledge; (3b) could be uttered even if the speaker
knows that both {Mary sang, Dina danced} are true—in fact this is an inference from
(3b) (see below). A continuation like but not both serves to bolster this point. As
shown below, this continuation has a different contribution in the two cases: with TP
disjunction it naturally conveys exhaustivity with respect to the embedded disjunctive
proposition (4), whereas with CP disjunction it can only convey exhaustivity with
respect to what constitutes Bill’s knowledge (5).
(4) Bill knows that Masha sang or Dina danced but not both. (TP ∨)
a. It is not the case both Masha sang and Dina danced.
b. 6 Bill doesn’t know both facts.
(5) Bill knows that Masha sang or that Dina danced, but not both. (CP ∨)
a. 6 It is not the case both Masha sang and Dina danced.
b. Bill doesn’t know both facts.
Finally, when the matrix subject is first person, the sentence with CP disjunction is
markedly odd (6). This is again because (3b) obligatorily gives rise to an ignorance
inference about the content of the matrix subjects’ knowledge; but it is odd to express
that you are ignorant about what you know.
(6) # I know that Masha sang or that Dina danced (but not both).
The second way in which (3a) and (3b) differ has to do with the factivity
inferences. With TP disjunction, we get a disjunctive presupposition (7); with
CP disjunction on the other hand the presupposition is conjunctive (8): it is both
presupposed that Masha sang and that Dina danced.
(7) Does Bill know that [Masha sang] or [Dina danced]? TP ∨
presupposes: Masha sang or Dina danced
(8) Does Bill know [that Masha sang] or [that Dina danced]? CP ∨
presupposes: Masha sang and Dina danced
This contrast is unexpected if the TP and the CP have the same denotation. Note
that the presupposition that we get with CP disjunction is identical to the one we get
with matrix disjunction (9).
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(9) Does Bill know [that Masha sang] or know [that Dina danced]? matrix ∨
presupposes: Masha sang and Dina danced2
We have replicated the contrasts above in three more languages: Russian, Hebrew
and Italian, and the judgments of all speakers converged. We provide example
sentences for CP disjunction that our consultants were asked about below (10).






























































Furthermore, the pattern is more general than just know: as far as we checked,
CP disjunction must take scope above any embedding attitude verb. For example
with the emotive factive got angry:
(11) Bill got angry that [Masha sang] or [Dina danced]. (TP ∨, angry > or)
(12) Bill got angry [that Masha sang] or [that Dina danced]. (CP ∨, or > angry)
The meaning difference between TP- and CP-disjunction suggests, contra Hin-
tikkan analysis of attitude verbs, that the CP meaning does not simply inherit the
meaning of the embedded TP. If it did, it is not clear what would force the high
scope for CP disjunction. The question then is: what is the contribution of the CP
layer that would successfully capture the facts? Before we present our proposal, we
would like to show that similar facts hold in the domain of conjunction.
2 A question that may arise at this point is whether sentences like (8) and (9) might have, at least
in some cases, a weaker presupposition than the conjunctive one, due to filtering. The issue of
presupposition projection from disjunction is complex both empirically and theoretically, and the
literature is not decisive (for relevant discussion see Geurts 1999; Beaver 2001; Schlenker 2008, a.o.).
But it seems to us that sentences of the form in (8) and (9) robustly project the factive presuppositions
from both disjuncts, unfiltered, even if this leads to pragmatic oddity or implausibility. This might
constitute an interesting problem for some theories of projection, but for the present purposes what is
crucial is that empirically the presuppositions of TP disjunction and CP disjunction are not identical.
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3 Embedded TP conjunction & CP conjunction
We investigated the readings that TP and CP conjunctions allow in the four languages,
and the sentences we elicited had the structure Subject Verb COMP p and q (= TP
conjunction) and Subject Verb COMP p and COMP q (= CP conjunction). We provide
example sentences with emotive factives and the predicate doubt below (with two
languages per the type of verbs due to space limitations).3
(13) English
a. Bill got angry [CP that [TP Masha sang] and [TP Dina danced]].


























































































‘I doubt that Maria sang and Dina danced.’
3 Some of the differences between TP conjunction and CP conjunction discussed in this section have
























‘I doubt that Maria sang and that Dina danced.’
Our empirical findings with respect to the interpretations of TP and CP conjunc-
tion constitute a less clear picture than we’ve seen with disjunction: for some of the
speakers across different languages and could take low scope in sentences with CP
conjunction, resulting in the same meaning that TP conjunction has. We set those
speakers aside for now and return to them in section 7. The rest of our speakers
reported the same contrast that we’ve seen with disjunction: TP conjunction involves
ATTITUDE > and reading, and CP conjunction involves and > ATTITUDE reading.
To illustrate this difference, conside the context in (17):
(17) Context: yesterday Masha sang and Dina danced at the same time, and they
produced so much noise that Bill/I couldn’t handle it. Individually, these
events are always pleasant.
This context rules out an interpretation where Masha’s singing and Dina’s danc-
ing individually affected the attitude holder in a negative way. It is only their
combination that caused the negative emotion. TP conjunction in (13a) and (14a)
is compatible with (17), but CP conjunction in (13b) and (14b) is not: it has an
inference that the attitude holder was angry or upset about both events individually.
The same point can be illustrated with doubt. Consider the context in (18).
(18) Context: Masha’s singing is quite likely, but Dina’s dancing is very unlikely.
Thus, the combination of these too events is also very unlikely.
If the context is as in (18), TP conjunction in (15a) and (16a) is felicitous: after
all, the attitude holder is indeed justified to doubt that the combination of the two
events occured due to the low probability of one of them. CP conjunction in (15b)
and (16b), however, is infelicitous in this context: its use requires that both events
are considered unlikely by the attitude holder.4
To sum up, data from disjunction and conjunction suggests that we need a
semantics for clausal embedding according to which CPs and their embedded TPs
are not semantically equivalent. Furthermore, the correct semantics ought to explain
the scope generalization which is summarized in (19):
4 Here we only presented data with emotive factive verbs and with doubt, but there are other predicates
that show the same pattern, e.g., Russian nevozmožno ‘impossible’ and Hebrew lo yitaxen ‘not
possible’, Russian ne dopuskat’ ‘not allow for the possibility’. We have to leave for future research a
proper investigation of these verbs and how to integrate them into our analysis.
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(19) a. JATTITUDE [CP or CP]K : * ATTITUDE > or,X or > ATTITUDE
b. JATTITUDE [CP and CP]K : * ATTITUDE > and,X and > ATTITUDE
4 Proposal
We offer the following theory of clausal embedding, which draws heavily on the
‘Content’ approach to clausal embedding initiated by Kratzer (2006) and is rooted
in a neo-Davidsonian framework where verbs have event arguments. The comple-
mentizer, we propose, is not semantically vacuous: it encodes a relation between a
proposition and a contentful event/individual (Kratzer 2006, 2016; Moulton 2009,
2015). ‘Content’ should be thought of as a kind of a theta role: just like some events
have Experiencers, Agents, etc., some (mental/abstract) events have Content. In
particular we propose that the relation that COMP encodes is identity (Moulton 2015;
Elliott 2017): the event’s content equals the proposition described by the TP. Thus,
the denotations for the complementizer (COMP), TP and CP are in (20).5,6
(20) a. JCOMPKw=λpst .λee.CONT(e) = p
b. J TP Mary sangKw=λw’s.sang(Mary)w′
c. J CP that Mary sangKw=λee.CONT(e) = λw’.sang(Mary)w′
The complementizer takes a proposition p and returns a predicate of events such that
when the function CONT (for “Content”) applies to them, it returns the proposition p.
So the CP “that Mary sang”, for example, denotes predicate of events such that their
Content is the proposition ‘Mary sang’ (20c). Embedding verbs on this approach
are simple predicates of events, like other verbs (21). They combine with the CP by
Predicate Modification.
(21) JknowK = λe. know(e)
One of the hallmarks of the Content approach to clausal embedding is that it
allows a uniform analysis of content CPs that appear with attitude verbs and content
CPs that appear with content nouns (attitudinal objects in (Moltmann 2020)) such as
fact, idea, rumor. Assuming that events and individuals are of the same semantic
type (see footnote 5), the compositional analysis of (22a) is straightforward: CP
combines with the noun by Predicate Modification, just like with the verb.
(22) a. the idea/rumor/fact that Mary sang
5 We are assuming that both events/states and individuals are in the same domain De.
6 The above-cited works contain a number of specific implementations of the way CPs are related to an
individual’s/event’s Content, but we disregard the differences in as much as our argumentation is not
affected by the choice between them.
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b. ιx ∈ De[ idea(x)/rumor(x)/fact(x) ∧ CONT(x) = λw’.sing(Mary)w′]
Let’s see how this helps us with the facts from sections 2 and 3. Our semantics
predicts that CP disjunction is not equivalent to TP disjunction, see (24)-(25) (for the
latter we assume that disjunction can have the type in (23), combining two 〈e, t〉-type
denotations).
(23) JorK = λPet .λQet .λee. P(e) ∨ Q(e)
(24) TP disjunction
J[CP that [TP Mary sang] or [TP Dina danced]]K =
λee. CONT(e) = λw’.sang(Mary)w′ ∨ danced(Dina)w′
(25) CP disjunction
J[CP that Mary sang] or [CP that Dina danced]K =
λee. CONT(e) = λw’.sang(Mary)w′ ∨ CONT(e) = λw’.danced(Dina)w′
Disjunction of the two TPs in (24) denotes a predicate of events whose Content is the
set of worlds where either Mary sang or Dina danced. Disjunction of the two CPs in
(25) denotes a predicate true of some event if either its Content is the proposition
“Mary sang” or its Content is the proposition “Dina danced”. When TP disjunction
and CP disjunction combine with the attitude verb, e.g. with know (21), and after
the existential closure of the event variable applies, we get the truth conditions in
(26) and (27) respectively.
(26) JBill knows that [T P Mary sang] or [T P Dina danced]K = 1
iff ∃e [know(e) & Exp(e) = Bill & CONT(e) = λw’.sang(Mary)w′ ∨ danced(Dina)w′]
(27) JBill knows [CP that Mary sang] or [CP that Dina danced]K = 1
iff ∃e [know(e) & Exp(e) = Bill & [CONT(e) = λw’.sang(Mary)w′ ∨ CONT(e)
= λw’.danced(Dina)w′]]
We can now explain the difference in ignorance inferences between TP and CP
disjunction. The logical representation in (27) contains a disjunctive claim regarding
what is the content of Bill’s knowledge state. The ignorance implication generally
associated with disjunction will derive that the speaker of (27) is not sure which
proposition constitutes the content of the attitude, as desired. In (26), in contrast,
the logical representation only entails that the content of the knowledge claim is
a disjunction. Correctly, no ignorance about the content of Bill’s knowledge is
predicted.
The difference in factivity inferences can be accounted for if we make an addi-
tional assumption that factive presuppositions are encoded in the complementizer
rather than in the embedding verb:
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(28) JCOMPKw=λpst : p(w)=1. λee.CONT(e) = p
The assumption that factivity is introduced by a complementizer can be motivated
by the fact that some languages have morphologically distinct factive and non-factive
complementizers. For example, Greek has a designated factive complementizer
pu and a designated non-factive one oti (Roussou 1994; Joseph 2016). Designated
factive complementizers are also found in dialects of Basque (Artiagoitia & Elordieta
2016): ena in Western Basque, bait in Lapurdian-Navarrese and Zuberoan dialects.
In Adyghe factivity is also marked in the embedded clause: adding the prefix zere
to the embedded predicate creates a factive complement (Serdobolskaya 2016). In
other languages there are complementizers marked for non-factivity: Lithuanian -ar
(Holvoet 2016), Maltese jekk (Borg & Fabri 2016) and Kalmyk giŽ9 (Knyazev 2016)
are examples of such cases. Thus, we might hypothesize that factivity is always
introduced by a complementizer, but languages differ in whether they mark this
distinction overtly or not.7
Now we can capture the factivity difference between (25)/(27) and (24)/(26).
(25) presupposes both that Mary sang and that Dina danced because there are two
factive complementizers in the sentence introducing two factive presuppositions
{Mary sang, Dina danced}, and so if disjunction acts as a hole with respect to
presupposition projection,8 we get the observed conjunctive presupposition. (24)
has a weaker, disjunctive presupposition that Mary sang or Dina danced because
there is only one complementizer, and disjunction is embedded under it.
As for conjunction, our proposal predicts that in contrast to TP conjunction, CP
conjunction should lead to a pathological meaning, (29)-(30).
(29) TP conjunction
J[CP that [TP Mary sang] and [TP Dina danced]]K =
λee. [CONT(e) = λw’.sang(Mary)w′ ∧ danced(Dina)w′]
(30) CP Conjunction
J[CP that Mary sang] and [CP that Dina danced]K =
* λee. [CONT(e) = λw’.sang(Mary)w′] ∧ [CONT(e) = λw’.danced(Dina)w′]
No event can have two different propositions as its unique content. This means that
the set of events that (30) is true of is an empty set. TP conjunction on the other
hand produces a coherent meaning (29): we get a predicate of events whose unique
7 We would like to note that this view requires some kind of selectional process between the predicate
and the CP to capture the lexical restrictions on the distribution of (non)-factive complements.
8 As we have noted in footnote 2, while it is far from clear that disjunction acts as a hole in the general
case, it seems that disjunction acts as a hole with respect to factivity presuppositions projecting from
CP disjunctions and matrix disjunctions.
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content is a conjunctive proposition. Thus, we predict the correct meaning for TP
conjunction and that CP conjunction should never be possible.
But as we saw in section 3, strings of the form Subject Vs COMP p and COMP q
are possible. If these strings do not arise from true CP conjunction, then how are
they derived? We suggest that these strings are derived by Conjunction Reduction or
a similar kind of ellipsis, see (31) (or with an equivalent semantic mechanism that
does not require ellipsis, such as Szabolcsi’s (2016) type-lifting operation).
(31) Subject Vs COMP p and COMP q
[Bill is angry that Mary sang] and [Bill is angry that Dina danced]
⇒ Bill is angry that Mary sang and that Dina danced.
Note that the complementizer encoding the identity relation in (20a) is crucial for
getting the fact that CP conjunction is not equivalent to TP conjunction. Compare our
result in (29)-(30) with the result that semantics based on the subset relation (Kratzer
2006) gives (32): this complementizer takes a propsition and returns a predicate of
events such that in all worlds compatible with their Content this proposition is true.
(32) JCOMPK = λpst .λee. ∀w’[w’∈ CONTe,w→ p(w’)=1]. (Kratzer 2006)
The meaning in (32) does not predict that CP conjunction should be pathological.
In fact, it predicts that CP conjunction and TP conjunction should result in the
same interpretation. This is so because CP conjunction under the meaning of the
complementizer in (32) is conjunction of two universals (34), and conjunction of
two universals is equivalent to one universal scoping over the conjunction, which is
the meaning that a single complementizer embedding a TP conjunction has (33).
(33) J[CP that [T P Ann came] and [T P that Lucy came]]K =
λee.∀w’[w’∈CONTe,w→ came(Ann)w′ ∧ came(Lucy)w′]
(34) J[CP that Ann came] and [CP that Lucy came]K =
λee.∀w’[w’∈CONTe,w→ came(Ann)w′]∧ ∀w’[w’∈CONTe,w→ came(Lucy)w′]
In both (33) and (34) we will get a predicate such that in all worlds compatible with
its Content two things hold: (i) Ann came; (ii) Lucy came. Thus, on the subset
semantics like in (32) something else would have to be blocking the low scope of
and for CP conjunction.
We would now like to briefly compare the proposal advanced in this paper with
the one argued for by Szabolcsi (1997, 2016), who also studies disjunction and
conjunction of CPs and reaches conclusions that are very similar to ours. While
Szabolcsi’s main focus is interrogative CPs, she also briefly discusses declarative
CPs and arrives at virtually the same empirical generalizations as the ones we
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described in sections 2 and 3. In order to capture the facts she considers (both
interrogative and declarative CPs), she proposes to treat COMP essentially as a
type-lifter. The lifting reverses the argument-function relationship between the
matrix verb and the embedded proposition, so that the proposition is a function
that takes the embedding verb as an argument rather than the other way around as
is standardly assumed. When CPs are dis/conjoined, this effectively derives high
scope for dis/conjunction with respect to the matrix verb, since the matrix verb
saturates an argument position in both CPs. Szabolcsi then explores two kinds of
possible motivations for complementizers having the semantics of lifters, which rely
on disjunctions of questions leading to ill-formed meanings (in (Szabolcsi 1997) the
explanation is provided in terms of partition semantics, and in (Szabolcsi 2016) in
terms of inquisitive semantics).9
While Szabolcsi’s COMP-as-Lifter theory derives the clausal embedding facts
with disjunction and conjunction, we believe that our account has the advantage
that it is embedded in a general and independently motivated theory of clausal
embedding, whereas the Lifting account is geared specifically to explain disjunction
and conjunction. Here we list a number of arguments in recent literature that make
crucial use of the Content approach to clausal embedding. For example, it has been
argued that clauses have to be predicates of individuals or events based on the fact
that they can modify content nouns (Kratzer 2006, 2016; see our (22)). Elliott (2017)
provided further arguments for viewing CPs as modifiers by discussing substitution
failures and nominalizations of clause-taking roots. It has also been observed that
CPs can build attitudes even without a designated attitude verb: for example, as
discussed in Kratzer (2016), intransitive verbs can combine with CPs (35).10
(35) Susi laughed / sighed that I forgot my keys again.
The abovenentioned phenomenona are difficult to analyze with a standard Hin-
tikkan view of attitude reports without extra assumptions. Our claim then is that our
specific implementation of the Content approach explains the dis/conjunction data
and renders the COMP-as-Lifter hypothesis unneeded (at least for declaratives CPs).
9 Szabolcsi (2016, section 3.3) also briefly considers what appears to be a version of our Content
analysis, as an alternative to the account where COMP is a type-lifter. One difference in that sketch is
that she assumes that apparent cases of CP conjunction involve lifting both CPs, whereas we have
argued that these cases involve syntactic ellipsis. While we don’t have an argument against lifting in
the general case, we would like to note that conjunction reduction would be necessary for some cases
even if availability of lifting is assumed. For example, the difference between the examples (43) and
(44) in the upcoming section 6 requires conjunction reduction strategy to be an option.
10 In this connection see (Bogal-Allbritten 2016, 2017) for discussion of the contribution of embedded
clauses in building attitude reports based on data from Navajo, (Banerjee, Karmakar & Ghosh 2019)
on how attitude reports are built from verbs that are not specialized attitude verbs in Bangla and
(Özyıldız 2018) for discussion of unselected questions in Altaic languages.
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5 Getting entailment with identity semantics
While the identity semantics gave us a way to explain the absence of the low scope
of AND with CP conjunction, it comes with what might look like a significant
shortcoming: we are loosing the account of entailment with upward-monotone
predicates like believe:
(36) Susi believes that Mary sang. Susi believes that Dina danced.
⇒ Susi believes that Mary sang and Dina danced.
Nothing in our analysis so far derives the entailment in cases like (36). However, an
account of such entailment in a theory with identity semantics for clausal embedding
have been developed in Elliott 2017, who proposes to slightly enrich the assumptions
about the ontology of belief states. Here we only have space to briefly outline the
main idea of this approach.
Elliott (2017) proposes that an individual is an experiencer of a plurality of belief
states at any given time. An individual’s belief states form a Boolean algebra which
has the closure property in (37).
(37) Let BSx be the set of x’s belief states. BSx is closed under meet (sum):
e,e′ ∈ BSx iff e⊕ e′ ∈ BSx.
Propositions also form a Boolean algebra. Elliott proposes that the function
CONT is a homomorphism from the Boolean algebra BSx to the Boolean algebra of
propositions.11 This analysis has the important consequence in (38).
(38) Iff CONT(e1) = p and CONT(e2) = q, then CONT(e1 ⊕ e2) = p ∧ q.
Existence of events e1 with content p and e2 with content q in the Boolean algebra
of belief states of the attitude holder guarantees that there should also be their sum
— the state e1 ⊕ e2 whose content is p ∧ q. This means that if the Boolean algebra
of Susi’s beliefs has a state e1 such that CONT(e1) = λw. sang(Mary)w and a state e2
such that CONT(e2) = λw. danced(Dina)w, than there has to be a state e1 ⊕ e2 among
her belief states whose content is λw. sang(Mary)w ∧ danced(Dina)w. The reverse is
true as well: if Susi has a belief state λw. sang(Mary)w ∧ danced(Dina)w, there have
to be two smaller belief states that correspond to the two conjoined propositions.
This, in a nutshell, is how the entailment is captured.12
11 A homomorphism is a function whose domain and range are Boolean algebras, and which is structure
preserving, i.e., it commutes with the Boolean operations.
12 Note that it is a property of believe that states in its characteristic set form a Boolean algebra; arguably
not all events of attitude predicates form Boolean algebras, which explains why the pattern in (36)
does not hold for many other attitude predicates (e.g. emotive factives).
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6 Additional evidence from Russian: a ‘but’ conjunction
In this section we provide additional support for the claim that strings of the form
Subject Vs COMP p and COMP q are derived by Conjunction Reduction. The
evidence comes from Russian conjunction a ‘but’ which requires two points of














































‘The day before yesterday Dina sang, but yesterday Dina danced.’
In (39a) we see a sentence where the subjects and the predicates in the two clauses
contrast with each other. In (39b) and (39c) we see that when only subjects or
only predicates contrast, the result is ungrammatical. Finally, (39d) shows that the
subjects of the two clauses can be the same if some other elements (the temporal
adverbs in (39d) contrast in the two clauses in addition to the predicates.
The logic of this argument is as follows. Under our proposal, strings of the form
in (40a) are derived from (40b) by Conjunction Reduction. This makes a prediction
that the grammaticality of (40a) should correlate with that of (40b): if (40b) is not
possible, (40a) should be ungrammatical as well.
(40) a. Subject Verb CP and CP
b. Subjectk Verb j CP and (Subjectk) Verb j CP
The requirement of a ‘but’ to conjoin propositions with two points of contrast
allows us to see that this prediction is borne out. First, note that in constructions
with attitude verbs any differences within the embedded CP count as a single point
of contrast as far as a ‘but’ conjunction is concerned. This is illustrated in (41)-(42).




















































‘The day before yesterday Lena thought that Dina sang, but yesterday she
thought that Masha danced.’
In (41) the embedded clauses have both different subjects and different predicates,
but this is not sufficient to conjoin the two matrix clauses with a ‘but’. Additional
point of contrast has to be present; in (42) this is achieved by adding two temporal










































‘The day before yesterday Lena thought that Dina sang, but yesterday (she
thought) that Masha danced.’
We see that the same restriction that we have seen with matrix TP conjunction is
present in (43)-(44), which have the structure in (40a): embedded CPs are viewed
as a single point of contrast, and additional point of contrast needs to be added
for a ‘but’ to be grammatical. Cf. the embedded TP conjunction (45), which is

















‘Lena thinks that Dina sang, but Masha danced.’
The data above shows that the string Subject Verb CP and CP (40a) is grammatical
with a ‘but’ only when the corresponding string Subjectk Verb j CP and (Subjectk)
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Verb j CP (40b) is. We conclude from this that (40a) can be only derived by Con-
junction Reduction, supporting our proposal that declarative embedded CPs cannot
be conjoined due to the fact that the resulting meaning would be ill-formed.
7 The speakers with a low-scope AND
As we have mentioned in section 3, while judgments about CP disjunction were
uniform across the speakers we consulted, we encountered variability in judgements
about CP conjunction. Consider the following example from English:
(46) I doubt [CP that Mary came] and [CP that Dina came].
a. and > doubt:
I doubt that Mary came and I doubt that Dina came.
b. doubt > and:
I doubt that both Mary came and Dina came.
Scenario: Mary’s coming is quite likely, but it’s unlikely that both of them
will come at the same time, because Dina avoids Mary.
In addition to the wide scope of conjunction that is available for all speakers (46a),
there are speakers across different languages who also accept the narrow scope
(46b). In (46b) the speaker does not doubt each proposition individually, but only the
combination thereof. Speakers who accept (46b) find sentences like (47) felicitous.
(47) I don’t doubt that Mary came, but I doubt that Mary came and that Dina
came.
The speakers that accept the low scope of AND raise a number of questions for
our proposal. First, given that we predict CP conjunction to be semantically deviant,
how do some speakers get the low scope of AND with CP conjunction? Second, why
are there no low scope OR readings with CP disjunction?14 Finally, what drives the
cross-speaker variation that we observe?
At this point, we do not have a handle on what drives the cross-speaker variation,
so we cannot develop a full-fledged account of this phenomenon. However, we
are fairly certain that the source of the variability cannot be that some speakers
treat the CP layer as semantically vacuous: if for some speakers CPs just inherited
the meaning of TPs, then CP disjunction and TP disjunction would have identical
meanings for them too, contra to what we found. Therefore, an explanation that
predicts the disjunction/conjunction asymmetry is called for.
14 We put aside cases which could be analyzed with decomposition and intermediate attachment of CP
disjunction, e.g., doubt = not think. See Szabolcsi (2015, 2016) for discussion.
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Here we will sketch a possible direction to the low-scope AND with CP conjunc-
tion which keeps the meanings of CPs and attitude verbs unchanged. The two main
ingredients that our sketch will rely on are a special non-Boolean meaning for AND
and Elliott’s (2017) idea that an individual’s belief states form a Boolean algebra
(see section 5). We will assume that while there is a non-Boolean AND, there is no
non-Boolean OR, thus deriving the observed asymmetry.
The non-Boolean AND that we need is presented in (48).
(48) JandNON-BOOLK =
λPet .λQet .λee. ∃e1,e2, [e1 ⊕ e2 = e ∧ P(e1) = 1 ∧ Q(e2) = 1]
In (48) andNON-BOOL takes two predicates, P and Q, and returns a predicate which
is true of sums of two individuals or events (e1 ⊕ e2 = e) such that P is true of
the first element of the sum (P(e1) = 1) and Q is true of the second element (Q(e2)
= 1). While we need (48) for conjoining two CPs, such a lexical item might be
independently needed in the nominal domain. There are cases of NP conjunction
which result in predicates that hold of sums of two singulars (Heycock & Zamparelli
2005; Champollion 2016; Fox & Johnson 2016). Consider the following examples:
(49) Every woman and man who came in together are smiling and frowning
respectively. (Fox & Johnson 2016: 6)
(50) that mutually incompatible man and woman ( 6= that mutually incompati-
ble man and mutually incompatible woman)
(Heycock & Zamparelli 2005: 253)
The NPs in (49)-(50) denote predicates which hold of pluralities that are sums of
two singulars: a man and a woman. The meaning for andNON-BOOL in (48) that we
will use for non-Boolean CP conjunction could account for such cases.
With the meaning for AND in (48) and the meanings of CPs in (51), we get (52)
as the meaning for the (non-Boolean) CP conjunction.
(51) a. Jthat Mary cameK = λe1. CONT(e1) = λw. came(Mary)w
b. Jthat Dina cameK = λe2. CONT(e2) = λw. came(Dina)w
(52) Jthat Mary came andNON-BOOL that Dina cameK = λee. ∃e1,e2, [e1 ⊕ e2 = e ∧
CONT(e1) = λw. came(Mary)w ∧ CONT(e2) = λw. came(Dina)w]
Now recall from the section 5 Elliott’s (2017) proposal that belief states of an
experiencer form a Boolean algebra. This proposal implies that if events in (52) are
belief events, then (38), repeated below as (53), holds.
(53) Iff CONT(e1) = p and Content(e2) = q, then CONT(e1 ⊕ e2) = p ∧ q.
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Therefore, CP conjunction with non-Boolean AND in (52) in fact denotes a
predicate of events whose Content is p ∧ q:
(54) Jthat Mary came andNON-BOOL that Dina cameK = λee. ∃e1,e2, [e1 ⊕ e2 = e ∧
CONT(e1) = λw. came(Mary)w ∧ CONT(e2) = λw. came(Dina)w]
= λee. CONT(e) = λw. came(Mary)w ∧ came(Dina)w.
Thus, we can get the low scope AND with CP conjunction in this indirect way:
by specifying the content of the two subevents of a belief event we are providing
its content due to CONT being a homomorphism from the Boolean algebra of belief
events to the Boolean algebra of propositions.
If doubt is analyzed as not think, we get the following meaning for (46).
(55) I doubt [that Mary came] and [that Dina came].
¬∃e [think(e) ∧ Exp(e)= Speaker ∧ ∃e1,e2, [e1 ⊕ e2 = e ∧ Content(e1) =
λw. came(Mary)w ∧ Content(e2) = λw. came(Dina)w]]
= ¬∃e [think(e) ∧ Exp(e)= Speaker ∧ Content(e) = λw. came(Mary)w ∧
came(Dina)w]]
This is equivalent to the TP conjunction I doubt that Mary came and Dina came.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that CP disjunction doesn’t have a meaning it is
expected to have if it were equivalent to a disjunction of propositions under a matrix
attitude. This is also true for CP conjunction for some speakers. We’ve derived this
difference between CP disjunction/conjunction and TP disjunction/conjunction using
the idea that the CP layer contributes a relation of identity between the proposition
and the content of an attitude state (Kratzer 2006, 2016; Moulton 2015; Elliott 2017).
We have observed that there are speakers for which CP conjunction can have
a meaning equivalent to TP conjunction under a single complementizer. We’ve
sketched a way to derive this low scope of AND with CP conjunction using non-
Boolean denotation for AND and Elliott’s (2017) idea that CONT is a homomorphism
from the Boolean algebra of belief states to the Boolean algebra of propositions.
9 Appendix: emotive factives
In this appendix we provide an implementation of our proposal with respect to
emotive factives. If an emotive factive verb falls into the category of predicates with
which CPs express content (subject matter CPs in (Hartman 2012)), then we do not
have to make any additional assumptions (see Elliott 2017).
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But there is a potentially more difficult case: a case when a CP combining with
an emotive factive denotes a cause of the mental state (causer CPs in (Hartman
2012)). We follow Elliott (2017) in treating such CPs as specifying the content of
the causing event, which is introduced in syntax by a functional projection CAUSE:
(56) JBill is angry that Mary sangK =
∃e,e’ [angry(e) ∧ Exp(e) = Bill ∧ Cause(e) = e’ ∧ Exp(e’) = Exp(e) ∧
CONT(e’) = λw. sang(Mary)w]
Unlike disjunction of TPs (57), disjunction of CPs (58) will then convey igno-
rance about the content of the cause of Bill’s anger.
(57) JBill is angry that Mary sang or Dina dancedK =
∃e,e’ [angry(e) ∧ Exp(e) = Bill ∧ Cause(e) = e’ ∧ Exp(e’) = Exp(e) ∧
[CONT(e’) = λw. sang(Mary)w ∨ danced(Dina)w]
(58) JBill is angry that Mary sang or that Dina dancedK =
∃e,e’ [angry(e) ∧ Exp(e) = Bill ∧ Cause(e) = e’ ∧ Exp(e’) = Exp(e) ∧
[CONT(e’) = λw. sang(Mary)w ∨ CONT(e’) = λw. danced(Dina)w]
Unlike TP conjunction (59), CP conjunction (60) will create an ill-formed meaning.
(59) JBill is angry that Mary sang and Dina dancedK =
∃e,e’ [angry(e) ∧ Exp(e) = Bill ∧ Cause(e) = e’ ∧ Exp(e’) = Exp(e) ∧
[CONT(e’) = λw. sang(Mary)w ∧ danced(Dina)w]
(60) JBill is angry that Mary sang and that Dina dancedK =
* ∃e,e’ [angry(e) ∧ Exp(e) = Bill ∧ Cause(e) = e’ ∧ Exp(e’) = Exp(e) ∧
[CONT(e’) = λw. sang(Mary)w ∧ CONT(e’) = λw. danced(Dina)w]
Finally, the low scope of AND with CP conjunction can be achieved in the same
way as with doubt, provided that we make an assumption that causing events of
emotive factives form a Boolean algebra (61).
(61) JBill is angry that Mary sang andNON-BOOL that Dina dancedK = ∃e,e’ [angry(e)
∧ Exp(e) = Bill ∧ Cause(e) = e’ ∧ Exp(e’) = Exp(e) ∧ ∃e1,e2, [e1 ⊕ e2 = e’
∧ CONT(e1) = λw. sang(Mary)w ∧ CONT(e2) = λw. danced(Dina)w]
= ∃e,e’ [angry(e) ∧ Exp(e) = Bill ∧ Cause(e) = e’ ∧ Exp(e’) = Exp(e) ∧
CONT(e’) = λw. sang(Mary)w ∧ danced(Dina)w
The assumption that events causing emotive states form Boolean algebras might
seem more plausible if the causers of emotive states are facts: if x is a fact with
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